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COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES:
WHAT IS "REASONABLE"?*
SAMUEL R. BERGER t
I. INTRODUCTION
In the overwhelming majority of professional matters handled
by lawyers, fees are determined privately between attorney and
client. This almost invariably is the case when the representation
does not involve litigation, unless, of course, a dispute over the fee
arises between attorney and client.1 Even when the representation
does involve litigation, the "American rule" on attorneys' fees, which
requires each party to a lawsuit to bear the cost of its own lawyer, is
firmly entrenched 2 and leaves the matter of attorneys' fees to be
resolved in accordance with the contractual arrangement between
attorney and client.
The American rule, however, is not without exceptions. In an
increasing number of litigation contexts, the critical arena for de-
termining who will ultimately bear the burden for the attorney's
services shifts from the lawyer's office to the courtroom. A growing
number of federal statutes-more than seventy to date 3 -either
0 This Article was prepared under the auspices of the Council for Public Interest
Law, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein, however, are solely those of
the author.
f A.B. 1967, Cornell University; J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Member,
District of Columbia Bar.
I Although many of the principles discussed in this Article would apply to cases
involving fee disputes between attorney and client, those cases are not specifically
addressed here. Rather, this Article focuses on those cases where courts are called
upon to determine whether, and to what extent, persons other than the client should
be required to pay for the services of an attorney with whom they have not expressly
contracted.
2 The American rule often has been criticized. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reim-
bursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. BEv. 792 (1966);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. REv. 75
(1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MmNN. L. REv. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's
Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FonDHuAm L. Ev. 761 (1972);
Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 202 (1966); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to
the Court, 122 U. PA. L. Buv. 636, 648-55 (1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where
Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VA4-D. L. REv. 1216 (1967). See also Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEG.L
S-Tum. 399, 437-38 (1973). Nonetheless, the American rule was recently strongly
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ayeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). For a discussion of the contrary "English rule" see
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALEu L.J. 849 (1929).
3 See note 104 infra & accompanying text.
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authorize or mandate courts to award attorneys' fees as part of the
relief granted. Moreover, although the Supreme Court's decision in
A lyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society 4 sharply limits
the authority of the federal courts to award attorneys' fees in the
absence of such an authorizing statute, the Court in Alyeska did
reaffirm the historic equity power of the federal courts to compel all
of the beneficiaries of a "common fund" recovered or preserved by
the plaintiff to pay, out of the fund, their proportionate share of the
compensation to which plaintiff's attorneys are entitled.5 The Court
also recognized the established equity power of the federal courts to
tax a losing party for its opponent's attorney's fees under a "common
benefit" theory, where the party compelled to pay fees was in effect
the beneficiary of the lawsuit,6 and against a party who has proceeded
"'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' ""
Although the threshold question before the courts in each of
these situations is whether an obligation for attorneys' fees should be
imposed upon someone other than the contractual client, courts
must determine not only "who pays," but also "how much." While
courts often describe their effort as fee "shifting," what is involved
is more than simply assigning a client's obligation for fees to others.
Under either equitable or statutory rationales for fee awards,
the amount the client agreed to pay the attorney does not necessarily
determine what others should be compelled to pay by the court.
The statutes that authorize a court to award attorneys' fees between
parties prescribe that "reasonable" fees shall be taxed." What con-
stitutes a reasonable fee may be more or less than the client is
obligated to pay the attorney. It is a determination that ultimately
must be made by the court. Nor is the court simply reallocating
the client's contractual obligation when it exercises its equitable
powers under the common fund or common benefit doctrines. While
the client's claim against the other beneficiaries in these situations
may be limited to one for contribution for litigation expenses
actually incurred,9 the attorney too has a claim against the bene-
4421 U.S. 240 (1975).
5 Id. 257.
6 Id. For example, an unsuccessful corporate defendant in a stockholder deriva-
tive suit can be compelled to pay the attorneys' fees for the plaintiff shareholder
where the corporation as a whole has benefited from the lawsuit. Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
7 421 U.S. at 258-59, quoting F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
8 See note 104 infra & text accompanying note 114 infra.
9 See note 73 infra & text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
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ficiaries for the reasonable value of his or her services.10 As will be
more fully discussed below, the attorney's contractual agreement
with his or her client will not necessarily represent the reasonable
value of those services because it may reflect the attorney's expecta-
tion of recovering additional compensation from other beneficiaries
of the lawsuit. Thus, whether the court is proceeding under statu-
tory or equitable authority, once it has determined that attorneys'
fees should be awarded, it cannot escape the task of determining the
reasonable fee to assess.
Part II of this article sketches the current confused and conflict-
ing state of the law on how a reasonable attorney's fee is determined.
Part III examines the two distinct sources of judicial power to
award fees-the equitable power of courts with a proper jurisdic-
tional grant to prevent unjust enrichment, and the statutory author-
ity conferred by Congress to aid the enforcement of designated
rights. In either context, the discretion of the courts in determining
the proper amount of a fee award is not unlimited. In the equitable
cases, courts must exercise their power in a manner consistent with
the fundamental purpose of preventing unjust enrichment. Simi-
larly, in the statutory cases courts are constrained to award fees that
further the congressional intent of promoting full enforcement of
the substantive rights underlying the fee provisions. Although the
source and purpose of the court's power in the equitable and statu-
tory contexts are distinct, the analysis in Part III suggests that they
lead to the same result: a reasonable fee in either context is one
that awards the attorney the market value of the time and effort
justifiably expended.
Part IV develops a framework for determining a reasonable fee
that is consistent with the purposes of such awards. The approach
advanced employs most of the factors considered by courts in the
past, purposely excludes others (particularly the results of the law-
suit), and does so within an analytic framework that would bring a
greater degree of consistency and objectivity to this expanding
judicial activity.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Given the frequency with which courts are confronted with the
task of fee setting and the impact that it has upon the allocation of
legal resources, one would expect a general consensus to have
emerged on the manner in which reasonable attorneys' fees should
10 See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
1977]
284 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
be determined. On the contrary, there are nearly as many ap-
proaches to the issue as there are judges. The Supreme Court has
never addressed the question,1 and most of the courts of appeals
have left the matter substantially to the discretion of the district
courts.' 2 As a result, many lower courts have confronted the prob-
lem with little or no analysis; those courts that have been more
analytical have adopted widely varying approaches. To a great
extent the outcome of these cases has depended upon "the roll of
the dice"-from court to court and from case to case.
Until quite recently the most common approach taken by the
lower courts in setting fees was no approach at all. A review of all
decisions reported in volumes 384-94 of Federal Supplement (1974-
1975) reveals that of the twenty-eight reported cases involving a fee
determination, thirteen contain absolutely no articulated reason for
the amount awarded. For example, in Canterbury v. Dick, 8 a case
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,14 which au-
thorizes the award of reasonable attorneys' fees,' 5 the court merely
stated that "[t]he court finds that $2,750.00 is a fair and reasonable
attorney's fee for legal services rendered to and for the Plaintiffs by
their counsel in the suit; and Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such
reasonable attorney's fee in such amount from the Defendants." 16
11 On several occasions, however, the Supreme Court has dealt with a party's
or attorney's entitlement to recover fees in a particular case. See, e.g., Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F. D. Rich Co. v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ.,
416 U.S. 696 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400
(1968); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Central R.R. v. Pettus, 113
U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The Court has
never squarely considered a question involving the proper amount of a fee award,
however.
12 The latitude conferred upon the district courts in making fee determinations
varies considerably among the circuits. The First Circuit has left the manner in
which fees are to be set almost entirely to the discretion of the lower courts. See
Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1974) ("The specific amount of
attorneys' fees is within the judge's discretion."). Several circuits have enumerated
lists of factors which the district court should consider in setting fees, see note 18
infra & accompanying text, and consequently have taken the view that "an analysis
by the district court which encompasses [those enumerated] considerations is most
assuredly an analysis well within the bounds of trial court discretion." Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). A few courts of appeals, most particularly the
Third Circuit, have been more rigorous in their review of fee awards, enumerating
a particular analytical framework for fee determinations and confining the lower
courts to that analysis. See note 28 infra.
'1 385 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
1429 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1HId. §216(b).
10 385 F. Supp. at 1009.
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More recently, most of the courts of appeals have recognized
that the failure to articulate the reasons for a particular fee award
renders the district court's determination effectively unreviewable
and constitutes an abuse of discretion.17 Several of these appellate
courts have adopted lists of factors to be considered by the trial
judge in making a fee determination.' s The list enumerated by the
Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,19 which
in turn was based upon the guidelines for private fee arrangements
set forth in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Responsibility,20 is most frequently cited. The court listed twelve
factors courts should consider in determining reasonable attorneys'
fees:
1) the time and labor required;
2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due
to acceptance of the case;
5) the customary fee;
6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
10) the "undesirability" of the case;
11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and
12) awards in similar cases.
21
17 See, e.g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson,
505 F.2d 105, 109 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177,
187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,
502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1973).
18 See, e.g., Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir.
1975); Monroe v. Board of Conm'rs of Jackson, 505 F.2d 105, 109 (6th Cir.
1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309,
1322 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
1' 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
20 ABA CoDE OF PROFESSiONAL REspONsmnInlY, DiscIpn'i~ y RuLE 2-106(B).
21488 F.2d at 717-19. By no means have the relevant factors listed by various
courts been uniform. Compare id. with Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372
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Simply providing the lower courts with an exhaustive check-
list of relevant factors, however, has done little to eliminate the
confusion. Many courts have done little more than give lip service
to their consideration of such factors. Meyers v. Clearview Dodge
Sales, Inc.22 is typical. After determining that a fee award was
appropriate under the Truth-in-Lending Act,23 the court stated:
In determining the amount of the fee in this case, we have
referred to the factors outlined by the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., . . a Title
VII case. We are further aware of the time and effort ex-
pended by plaintiff's counsel, much of which was occa-
sioned by the defendants' strenuous and able defense.
Considering all of these factors, plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover the sum of $3,000 as a reasonable attorney's fee.2
Other courts have discussed some or all of the factors seriatim and
then jumped to a no less conclusory judgment.
2 5
The fundamental problem with an approach that does no
more than assure that the lower courts will consider a plethora
of conflicting and at least partially redundant 26 factors is that it
provides no analytical framework for their application. It offers no
guidance on the relative importance of each factor, whether they
F. Supp. 1349, 1351-52 (N.D. IMI. 1974) and Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258, 302 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds,
377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and
In Re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
22384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3)
(Supp. IV 1974)).
24384 F. Supp. at 729.
25See, e.g., Kelsey v. Weinberger, No. 1660-73 (D.D.C. April 8, 1975);
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp.
991, 995-97 (D.D.C. 1974), re'd on other grounds sub nom. National Council of
Community Mental Health Centers v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. III. 1972); TWA v.
Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (in a case involv-
ing a $7.5 million fee award); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
245 F. Supp. 258, 302-03 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 377 F.2d
776 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
26 For example, the "time and labor required" (Johnson factor 1) usually will
substantially reflect the "novelty and difficulty of the questions" involved in the
case (Johnson factor 2).
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are to be applied differently in different contexts, or, indeed, how
they are to be applied at all.
27
A few circuits recognize that such an approach is an invitation
to further confusion and have adopted a particular analytical frame-
work to be used by lower courts in setting fees.28  While this de-
velopment should bring some measure of consistency to fee calcula-
tions in those circuits, the approaches adopted are by no means
uniform; moreover, these formulations contain significant defects.29
The most significant disparity in the manner of fee setting is
between those courts that have stressed the results achieved (the
output of the lawsuit) and those that have stressed the amount of
time expended by the attorneys (the input of the attorneys). For
many courts, particularly where damages are recovered by the
plaintiff, "[t]he key criterion for the award of counsel fees is not
the time spent but the amount of recovery." 30 Many of these
courts simply have awarded counsel a flat percentage of the re-
covery.31  Others, while rejecting the idea of applying a percentage
2 7 As a consequence, different courts have applied the same factor in contrary
ways. For example, some courts have viewed the fact that benefits were conferred
on the general public by the litigation as a consideration that should increase the
award, while other courts have seen this factor as one which should lower it.
Compare, for example, the opinion of the court of appeals in Kiser v. Huge, 517
F.2d 1237, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1974), with the district court opinion it affirmed in
this respect, Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), modified
sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Several courts have
taken account of the contingent nature of the representation only when the client
agreed to pay the attorney a percentage of the recovery if successful, while other
courts have recognized a contingency factor whenever the attorney has taken the
case without a guarantee of full payment. Compare Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) with
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
28 The initiative in this direction has come from the Third Circuit. In three
recent cases it has prescribed an approach that awards fees based upon the normal
hourly rate for the time expended, "adjusted" for the contingency of the case and
the quality of the attorney's effort as reflected in the court's evaluation of the work
it observed, the complexity of the issues, and the result achieved. See Lindy Bros.
Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1976); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3rd Cir. 1975); Lindy
Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1973). The Lindy approach has been adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit, National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir.
1975), and, at least for certain cases, by the Eighth Circuit, Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
The Second Circuit has outlined a similar, although not identical approach. See
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
29 See text accompanying notes 61-68, 83-91 & 144-52 infra.
30 Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
31 See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th
Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wade v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
371 U.S. 801 (1962); Feder v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Rosenfeld v. Black, 56 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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to the recovery, have taken the size of the damage award into con-
sideration in arriving at the appropriate hourly rate to apply against
the lawyer's time. Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago 32 is
illustrative of this latter approach. After examining the number
of hours expended by the plaintiffs' attorneys in obtaining a settle-
ment of that private antitrust action, the court multiplied the hours
spent by four times the attorneys' normal billing rates, explaining:
"This Court's award of four times the hourly rate of the plaintiffs'
attorneys is meant to adequately compensate them for initiating this
significant litigation and negotiating such a beneficial settlement
for the class .... 33
Those courts that have viewed the results achieved as
the essential ingredient of the fee determination have varied
dramatically in their ultimate judgment of how much of the
recovery the attorneys should receive. Even in cases of a similar
nature, the range has been enormous. For example, in eighteen
private antitrust cases examinedu the fee awarded ranged from five
to sixty-seven percent of the treble damages or settlement.3 5 Any
32372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
331d. 1359.
34 (Percentages following each case indicate the court awarded attorneys' fees
as percentage of treble damages or settlement.) See Perkins v. Standard Oil of
California, 474 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973) (12%);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964) (33%); A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 314 F.2d
839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963) (24%); Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 801
(1962) (15%); Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960) (34%); Darden v. Besser, 257 F.2d 285 (6th
Cir. 1958) (67%); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theater Corp.,
194 F.2d 846, 859 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952) (9%); Milwaukee
Towne Corp. v. Loews, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 569 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
909 (1951) (8%); American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F.2d 919, 920 (5th
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) (19%); Woode Exploration & Pro-
ducing Co. v. Alcoa, [1973] TRADE BE. REP. (CCH), 174,668 (20%); Pacific
Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, [1973] TRADE REc. REp.
(CCH), ff 74,523 (28%); Vandervelde v. Put and Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344
F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (50%); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (33%); Hartford Hosp. v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
[1972] TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH), 74,112 (10%); TWA v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (5%); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machine Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258, 303 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds,
377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd in part on other grounds, re'd in part on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (15%); Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (13%); Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference, 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218
(3d Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (31%).
35The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides that a successful plaintiff
in a private antitrust action "shall" recover three times his or her damages "and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." As a result of that and
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attempt to discern a rational basis for the dramatic variation in
these cases-based upon the difficulty of the case, its importance to
the public, or even the hours devoted by the attorneys-is fruitless.3 6
Although the result achieved has been the most important
factor in determining counsel fees for many courts, other courts have
considered the results of the lawsuit as supplementary only,37 and a
few courts have essentially ignored the results entirely.38 For the
latter courts, the perceived essential task is to compensate the attor-
neys for the time they devoted to the lawsuit.3 9 However, even
among courts that have adopted the time-spent approach there has
been substantial differences in analysis, leading to widely disparate
results.
other similar provisions in the antitrust laws, settlements in these cases frequently
include an agreement by the defendant to pay reasonable attorneys' fees. Grunin
v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 864 (1975); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir.
1974); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1350-51 (N.D.
I1. 1974). Where there is no such agreement, courts regularly award counsel fees
in settlements of private antitrust class actions out of the common fund, although
not always articulating the basis of their authority. See, e.g., Detroit v. Grinnel
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 164-66 (3d Cir. 1973); In Re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 680, 689-90 (D.
Minn. 1975).
36 The almost uncontrollable impulse of some courts to determine counsel fees
based upon the amount of the recovery is well illustrated by Colson v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. 11. 1972), a private antitrust case that was settled for
slightly in excess of $5 million. After ostensibly rejecting the idea of calculating a
fee based upon a percentage of the recovery, suggesting instead that "the primary
consideration ought to be the dollar value to be attributed per hour of service,"
id. 327, the court turned to the number of hours that the attorneys had spent on
the case-6,238. The court then stated "that $152.29 per hour is a fair award of
compensation, the total amount awarded for 6,238 hours coming to $950,000. This
amount is about 18.5% of the net settlement sum .... ." Id. 329. It is unlikely
that the court determined, in the first instance, that the value of an hour of these
attorneys' services was $152.29. Rather it seems clear that, in spite of itself, the
court concluded that $950,000 was a reasonable share of the settlement, deriving
its hourly rate from arithmetic rather than the marketplace.
37 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976); National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon,
521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes,
513 F.2d 114, 129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Merola v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).
38For example, while the Second Circuit did not specifically rule out con-
sideration of the results as one of the "other, less objective factors [that] can be
introduced into the calculus," Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d
Cir. 1974), it proceeded to outline a framework of analysis which did not include
a consideration of results.
39 The Third Circuit calls this the 'lodestar" determination, to which adjust-
ments can be made in certain circumstances. See Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 112 (3d Cir. 1976).
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The first determination for these courts has been the time
expended by the attorneys. Some courts have rigorously reviewed
the time asserted by the attorneys and the manner in which it was
expended; 40 others have engaged in wholesale markdowns with
little explanation of why the time claimed was excessive.4'
In deriving the hourly rate to be applied to the time allowed,
courts most frequently start with the attorney's normal billing rate,
or the prevailing rate for similar legal services in the community.
That rate, however, has been discounted in some contexts and sub-
stantially marked up in others. It is not uncommon, for example,
for courts to deflate the hourly rate for experienced trial attorneys
in civil rights and environmental litigation to as low as thirty
dollars,42 while raising the rate in private antitrust and securities
cases to as much as five hundred dollars per hour.43
Some courts have based the hourly rate multiplier (which may
range as high as 400% of the normal rate 44) upon the risk of non-
recovery; 45 others, upon the results achieved.4 6 Moreover, regard-
less of which factor is being rewarded by inflating the hourly rate,
the process of selecting an appropriate multiplier has been essen-
tially arbitrary. In a recent antitrust class action involving the
drug industry, for example, the court, after determining the number
of hours and the normal billing rates for the various attorneys and
law firms involved, multiplied the hourly compensation by a "risk
4 0 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
41 See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1067 (D.D.C. 1976);
Larinoff v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 140, 146-47 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 533 F.2d
1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318, 1320 (D.D.C.
1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. United States, 61 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C.
1973).
42 See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 114041 (1st Cir.), vacated,
423 U.S. 809 (1975); Red School House v. OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1199 (D.
Minn. 1974); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Assn., 377 F. Supp.
1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1974); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318, 1320 (D.D.C.
1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,
reo'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
4 3 See, e.g., In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 410 F. Supp. 680, 694 (D. Minn. 1975); In Re Gypsum Cases, 386
F. Supp. 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372
F. Supp. 1349, 1358-59 (N.D. Ill. 1974); City of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 345 F. Supp. 454, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
44 See, e.g., Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1358-59
(N.D. Ill. 1974).
45 See, e.g., In Re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
46 See, e.g., Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1358-59
(N.D. Ill. 1974).
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factor" of from 1 to 3.47 The court never explained how it dis-
tinguished between a multiplier of 2.5 and one of 3. Nonetheless,
for the senior attorney in the case, the difference between the max-
imum "overall rating" of 3 and the minimum of 1 was over $2
million in fees.
48
Another common approach of courts focussing primarily on
the time expended by the attorneys is the addition of a "bonus" or
"incentive premium" after calculating the fee based upon a normal
hourly rate.49 But even these courts have differed sharply on what
is being rewarded by such a bonus or incentive. In Kiser v. Miller,0
the court awarded the attorney a 10% bonus with no clear ex-
planation of why the reward was justified. In Pealo v. Farmers
Home Administration 51 the attorneys were awarded a 50% bonus
based upon the results achieved. In Lindy Bros. Builders v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II) 52 the Third
Circuit affirmed a bonus of 100% based upon the risk involved in
the case and the unusually high quality of work performed by the
attorneys. In National Association of Regional Medical Programs,
Inc. v. Weinberger 53 the court awarded plaintiffs' attorneys a 100%
bonus based upon an amalgam of factors, some of which already
were reflected in the amount of time spent or the normal billing
rate. The bonus incorporated
the benefits conferred upon the class, the benefits conferred
upon the public, the contingent nature of the fee arrange-
ment, the difficulty of the issues and the skill demonstrated,
the preclusion of other employment, the incentive fee or
47 In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions
(Doughboy Industries), 410 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn. 1975). Although the court
described its multiplier as a "risk factor," its application of the multiplier to various
lawyers and types of work involved in the case indicates that the court in fact was
applying what it at one point described as an "overall rating" to the various
lawyers' work and contribution. Id. 697.
48 Id. 694.
49 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 113 (3d Cir. 1976); Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund,
517 F.2d 1267, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 687-88 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977); Larinoff v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 140, 146-47 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd,
533 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. United States,
61 F.R.D. 13, 21 (D.D.C. 1971); Blankenship v. Boyle, 337 F. Supp. 296, 302-03
(D.D.C. 1971).
0364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318 (D.D.C. 1973).
1412 F. Supp. 561, 567-68 (D.D.C. 1976).
52540 F.2d 102, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1976).
53396 F. Supp. 842, 850-51 (D.D.C. 1975).
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bonus in similar cases, and the other factors enumerated
in Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel . . .54
The only truly consistent thread that runs throughout federal
court decisions on attorneys' fees is their almost complete incon-
sistency. The resulting confused and conflicting state of the law
has several unfortunate consequences. First, it inevitably results
in unfairness to both attorneys and litigants. At present, the
enormous variation in fee awards cannot be explained in terms of
the differing facts and circumstances from case to case. Rather, it
reflects the dissimilar manner in which various courts approach the
job of fee setting. As a result, from court to court and from case to
case, attorneys and litigants who are similarly situated are subjected
to widely differing treatment.
The generally arbitrary nature of fee awards has generated two
conflicting criticisms leveled at the courts. On the one hand, in-
ordinately high fee awards in some cases, and the absence of a
coherent rationale for justifiably large awards in other cases, have
lent support to the sentiments of the Italian proverb that "a lawsuit
is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden." As one commentator
has noted, "the bitterest complaints [about the legal profession] from
laymen [are directed at] the windfall fees and featherbedding that
lawyers have managed to perpetuate through . . . their influence
with the judiciary." 55 Others, particularly members of the public
interest bar, have contended that fee awards in certain kinds of
litigation-environmental and civil rights lawsuits, for example-
often have been unreasonably low.56 Given the current state of the
law, both criticisms have merit.
A second consequence of the chaotic state of the law is an ex-
cessive amount of litigation concerning the proper fee amount. In
some cases the issue of attorneys' fees becomes more complicated,
and involves more attorney time, than the underlying lawsuit.5 7 Al-
54 Id. 850.
55 Graham, Guest Opinion on Legal Fees: Fluffing the Golden Fleece, Jums
DocToR 10-11 (February, 1973). See also Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,
469 (2d Cir. 1974); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer, Inc., 481 F.2d 1045,
1049-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Il. 1972); Free World
Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
56 See, e.g., CouNcm For PuBiac NrERST LAw, BALAcNcio TE ScAims or
JuSIcE: FxNANcING PuBLIc INTEREST LAW IN AMECA 321 (1976).
57 See, e.g., Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1316-17 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (nearly half of
the bulk of paper filed in the case involved attorneys' fee issues); National Council
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though lawyers can be expected to assert their fee claims strenuously,
a more rational and consistent approach among the courts would
greatly reduce the existing necessity of relitigating the ground rules
in each case.
A third consequence of the existing state of the law is the
arbitrary and haphazard allocation of legal resources. It is clear,
for example, that attorneys' fee awards in private antitrust actions
under the Clayton Act 5s have generally been substantially higher
than awards in employment discrimination cases under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 Yet in both cases courts are
proceeding under congressionally enacted attorneys' fee provisions
designed to encourage private enforcement of the underlying stat-
utory policies. One searches in vain for any expression by Congress
of the relative importance of private antitrust versus private civil
rights enforcement. Yet the courts have provided far more attrac-
tive financial inducements for lawyers to represent private antitrust
claimants. If judgments about the relative importance of differing
statutory rights are to be made, those judgments should be made
deliberately by Congress, not unwittingly by courts in the process
of fixing attorneys' fees.00
Finally, the high degree of subjectivity involved in most fee
decisions is unhealthy for both the legal profession and for the
conduct of litigation. Although In Re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (Doughboy Industries),"
may be an extreme example of how much can ride on the court's
"overall rating" of an attorney, 2 many courts explicitly consider the
quality of the attorney's work in determining the amount of the
fee award. 3 Such considerations are, of course, a double-edged
sword; several courts apparently have decreased the fee award where
the work of the attorneys did not meet with their approval. In
Freeman v. Ryan," for example, the court pointedly noted that
of Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 991, 996
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (more than
half of the time asserted by attorney related to fee questions).
53 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
60 See text accompanying notes 128-39 infra.
61410 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn. 1975).
62 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
63 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
64408 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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"we would be less than candid if we failed to note that a significant
aspect of the research required for the prior opinion had to be
undertaken by this court, and . . . the sharpness of tone and
approach in various submissions diluted the assistance available
from counsel." 65 Grading the quality of attorneys' work in setting
their compensation creates an uneasy tension between the attorneys'
duty to press their clients' interests vigorously and at times even
contentiously before the court, and the fear of the attorneys that, in
so doing, they may literally pay the price at the close of the lawsuit.
While most lawyers will not pull their punches, nor will most courts
arbitrarily punish overassertive attorneys or reward favored ones,
those suspicions inevitably will undermine the confidence of the
bar and the public in the integrity of the judicial fee-setting func-
tion.66 Upgrading the quality of the litigation bar unquestionably
is a worthwhile objective, but there are other methods not requir-
ing that an attorney's compensation in a particular case turn upon
the impression he or she makes upon the court.
Even where courts have not expressly evaluated the quality of
the attorney's work, the process of fee setting nonetheless has in-
volved a high degree of subjectivity, either because the courts have
not articulated the basis for their determinations or because of the
high degree of selectivity involved in picking and choosing among
almost inexhaustible lists of sometimes conflicting factors. This
lack of objective standards and the resulting vulnerability of the
courts to the criticism that such awards reflect "the strong fellow-
feeling of judges for brothers in the guild" 67 certainly must account,
in part at least, for the view expressed by several courts that the
practice of awarding attorneys' fees is "delicate, embarrassing and
disturbing." 68
65 Id. 1206.
66 In rejecting an abandonment of the basic American rule regarding attorneys'
fees, the Supreme Court was concerned with, among other things, "the possibility
of a threat being posed to the principle of independent advocacy by having the
earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues."
F. D. Rich v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). That threat is
greatest where the determination of the court cannot be measured against objective
standards.
67 Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87
HI-v. L. REv. 1597, 1653 (1974).
68 Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 569 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952); see Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469
(2d Cir. 1974).
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III. WHAT Is "RFASONABLE" MUST BE DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF
THE SOURCE AND PURPOSE OF THE COURT'S POWERS
The wide range of approaches that district courts have applied
in determining reasonable attorneys' fees reflects the broad discre-
tion in fixing fees allowed by the courts of appeals. While it is
unquestionably true that, except in unusual circumstances,69 the
district court should establish the fees in the first instance, 70 its dis-
cretion is not unlimited. The concept of reasonableness may not
be susceptible of mathematical precision, but neither is it devoid of
content. The power of the district court to impose extracontractual
fee obligations derives from identifiable historical or statutory
sources, and that power must be exercised in a manner designed to
effectuate its purposes. Thus, the starting point for determining
what is a reasonable fee must be an examination of the source and
purpose of the courts' authority to award them.
The Supreme Court made clear in Alyeska that federal courts
do not have roving authority to impose fee obligations whenever
they deem it appropriate.7 1 Rather, federal courts must derive their
authority from one of two distinct sources: (1) the historic equity
power of the courts to impose fee obligations in certain definable
circumstances, or (2) a statute authorizing or mandating fee awards.
A. The Equity Power
In Alyeska the Court strictly limited the equity power of the
federal courts to award attorneys' fees to certain historically recog-
nized situations. Specifically, the Court reaffirmed three bases for
such equitable authority: the common fund, the common benefit,
and the bad faith rationales.
Of these three equitable bases, the common fund rationale
arises most frequently. It received Supreme Court sanction nearly
a century ago in Trustees v. Greenough.72 In that case a bondholder
of the Florida Railroad Company sued, on behalf of himself and
69 See, e.g., Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), re'd on other
grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977); Freeman v. Ryan, 408 F.2d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
70 In one of its earliest decisions on attorneys' fees, the Supreme Court noted
that the lower court "has far better means of knowing what is just and reasonable
than an appellate court can have." Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537
(1882). As the First Circuit has stated, "the lower court . . . has lived with the
case and, therefore, is more alert to the merits of each request for counsel fees."
Green v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 326 F.2d 492, 496 (1st Cir. 1964).
71 421 U.S. at 260.
72 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
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the other bondholders, the trustees of a land fund that had been
pledged as security for the bonds, alleging, inter alia, that the
trustees were wasting those security assets. The suit succeeded in
bringing the assets within the control of the court. The Supreme
Court held that the complainant was entitled to reimbursement for
his costs, including his attorneys' fees, out of the fund itself.73  The
Court reasoned that
[i]t would be very hard on [the complainant] to turn him
away without any allowance except the paltry sum which
could be taxed under the fee-bill. It would not only be
unjust to him, but it would give to the other parties en-
titled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair
advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself;
and if he cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself, they
ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses
which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge
upon the fund is the most equitable way of securing such
contribution. 74
The Court in Greenough applied the traditional equitable
principle of unjust enrichment, derived from the law of restitution,
which postulates that "enrichment through another's loss is unjust
and should be restored." 71 The court's control over the assets that
had been recovered or preserved gave it jurisdiction to compel the
beneficiaries of the complainant's effort, who had not been person-
ally before the court, to contribute proportionately to the complain-
ant's costs by charging those costs against the fund.
Three years later, in Central Railroad & Banking Co. of
Georgia v. Pettus,76 the Supreme Court extended the principle by
holding that the attorney has an independent claim to reimburse-
ment from the fund. Several unsecured creditors of the Montgomery
and West Point Railroad Company had succeeded in establishing
73 While allowing the complainant "his reasonable costs, counsel fees, charges,
and expenses incurred in the fair prosecution of the suit," id. 537, the Court spe-
cifically found objectionable allowances for "the personal services and private
expenses of the complainant." Id.
74 Id. 532. For a discussion of the history of congressional enactments pre-
scribing the taxable costs which routinely can be recovered in the federal courts,
see Alyeska Pipeline Sere. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975).
Those provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970).
75 Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HAnv. L. REv. 849, 850 (1975). See also RESTATEmENT OF RmTrrsToq § 1
(1937); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTBAcrs §§ 5, 348 (1932); 66 Am. Jun. 2d Restitution
and Implied Contracts §§ 3, 24 (1973).
76113 U.S. 116 (1885).
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that their lien on certain property was superior to the rights of a
company that had subsequently acquired the property from the
railroad. The Court held that "when an allowance to the complain-
ant [out of the fund] is proper on account of solicitors' fees, it may
be made directly to the solicitors themselves without any application
by their immediate client." 77
The impact of Central Railroad, however, goes beyond the
simple proposition that the attorney has standing to assert the client's
claim for fee reimbursement against the fund; the Court held that
the attorney's cause of action is independent of the client's and is
not limited to the amount that the client is obligated to pay. In
opposing the award, counsel for the appellants had argued
that the utmost which the court may do is to charge upon
the property such reasonable expenses as complainants
themselves incurred, and became directly and personally
bound to meet; and, since appellees [the attorneys] have
received from the creditors, specially engaging their serv-
ices, all that those creditors agreed to pay, it cannot be
said that the compensation demanded in respect of such
as were not parties, otherwise than by filing their claims
[against the fund] with the register, constitute a part of the
expenses incurred by the complainants. 78
Noting that this aspect of the general question had not been
presented in Greenough,7 9 the Court proceeded to reject that argu-
ment. Acknowledging that the attorneys had received their con-
tractual fee from their clients, the Court nonetheless concluded that
the litigation had conferred value on the otherwise worthless bonds
of all the unsecured creditors. As a consequence,
[t]he creditors who were entitled to the benefit of the
decree had only to await its execution in order to receive
the full amount of their claims; and that result was due to
the skill and vigilance of the [attorneys], so far as the result
of litigation may, in any case, be referred to the labors of
counsel.8 0
Accordingly, the Court held that the attorneys were entitled to
"reasonable compensation for their professional services in estab-
lishing a lien, on behalf of the unsecured creditors." 81
77Id. 124-25.
78 Id. 125.
791d.
So Id. 126.
81 Id. 127.
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Thus, the Court extended the unjust enrichment principle of
Greenough to encompass the efforts of the attorneys themselves.
The efforts of the attorneys conferred a benefit upon an ascertain-
able class, and the court's control of the assets preserved by those
efforts enabled it to prevent beneficiaries not before the court from
appropriating the benefits without incurring the costs. In that re-
spect, Central Railroad was a logical extension of the restitution
principles of Greenough.
The Supreme Court then proceeded, in a conclusory fashion
that has become characteristic of fee award determinations, to award
the attorneys a percentage of the proceeds.82 In so doing, the Court
planted the seed which has matured into the lawyers' fruit tree.
As Professor John Dawson has convincingly demonstrated in two
recent articles, 3 the proposition that an attorney should be awarded
a share of the proceeds of the lawsuit, as a measure of his or her
compensation for producing those results, is a misapplication of the
restitution principles upon which it rests. Certainly an attorney
can contract with his or her client to be paid upon any mutually
agreeable basis, including a percentage of the client's recovery. In
Central Railroad, however, and in the multitude of common fund
cases which have followed from it, courts are not enforcing con-
tractual obligations; they are creating extracontractual ones. The
courts have jurisdiction to impose such obligations upon nonclient,
nonparty beneficiaries because of their control over the fund against
which the fee is charged. 4  The rationale for imposing such obliga-
tions arises from the equitable principle of unjust enrichment.85
82 Id. 128.
83 Dawson, supra note 67; Dawson, supra note 75.
84 Even in class action suits, where the noncient beneficiaries of the lawsuit
are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court as members of the plaintiff class,
courts have been unwilling to impose binding in personam obligations against them
for attorneys' fees. The power of the courts to render binding in personam judg-
ments on the absent members of the class, consistent with due process, depends
upon the presence of adequate representatives of the class. Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940). As the District of Columbia Circuit recently has held, however,
the court has a duty to "undertake a stringent and continuing examination" of the
adequacy of representation. National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v.
Mathews, Inc., 551 F.2d 340, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). The court
held that when the fee petition is being asserted by the class's counsel, or by the
class's representative who attempts to make the absent members of the class respon-
sible for a portion of the fee obligation, the petitioner's interests are adverse to the
absent class members. Therefore, neither is an adequate representative for the
purpose of imposing an in personam judgment for attorneys' fees against the absent
members. See also National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v.
Matthews, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A court, however, need not reach the
question of in personam jurisdiction when it has jurisdiction over the fund and a
fee award from it is not otherwise barred, for example, by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
85 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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The enrichment is unjust, however, only to the extent that the
beneficiaries have not compensated the creator for the losses he or
she incurred. Beyond that, the enrichment-even though it may
have been unanticipated by the beneficiaries-is not unjust at all,
but merely a measure of their legal injury. By awarding attorneys
a share of the damages which exceeds the value of their time and
effort expended, the courts have applied the extraordinary equitable
remedy of fee awards in a way that exceeds its rationale.
Professor Dawson points out that in every other analogous legal
context the remedy for one who has conferred an unsolicited benefit
upon another is limited to the loss he or she incurred in conferring
the benefit."" Indeed, in the Greenough-type situation the right of
the plaintiff to recover is limited to the costs incurred. 7 Yet the
attorney, whose capacity to confer a benefit upon others is merely
derivative of the client's cause of action, has been treated differently
by the courts and has been allowed not only to recover his or her
loss but to share in the benefits themselves. Professor Dawson
concludes that "[t]here is nothing in the law of restitution, or indeed
in the law of contract, that provides either justification or analogy
for the profitsharing privileges that have been conferred, uniquely,
on lawyers." 88
That is not to say, however, that the attorney merely stands in
the shoes of the client, or that the attorney's claim necessarily will
be measured by the contractual obligation of the client. An attor-
ney may agree to take a case on a basis that will not fully compensate
the time and effort to be expended because of the expectation that
the lawsuit will create or preserve a fund for the benefit of a
broader class. To the extent the contract with the client affords the
attorney less than the market value of his or her time and effort,
the attorney has incurred a loss in the course of conferring benefits
86 Dawson, supra note 75, at 850.
87 There is no authority for the plaintiff's recovery of a share of the other
beneficiaries' damages in addition to recovering litigation expenses.
8 8 Dawson, supra note 75, at 929. Professor Dawson notes that in some limited
contexts
[r]estitution remedies ...sometimes award an accounting for profit with-
out any finding of corresponding loss. This occurs primarily where
fiduciary obligations have been violated, and in a few types of intentional
torts but the motive of deterring wrongdoing in such cases is strong enough
to justify, indeed to require, taking away all the profit. In the situations
to be considered here all elements of misconduct are completely missing.
The most that can be said is that successful litigation has cast on strangers,
as an inevitable byproduct, some benefit which they retain for the quite
sufficient reason that the litigation has proved it to be theirs.
Id. 852 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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upon others.8 9 That loss is the measure of the unjust enrichment
to the nonclient beneficiaries. Where the court has jurisdiction to
prevent such unjust enrichment because of its control over a fund,
the attorney will have a claim against the fund for that difference.
In short, the rationale underlying the common fund doctrine
supports the plaintiff's recovery of all but his or her share of the
actual costs incurred in conferring the benefit upon others,90 and
supports recovery by the attorney of the market value of his or her
time and effort, to the extent not so compensated by the client. It
does not support more. In fact, if the costs incurred by the attorney
exceed the total benefit conferred (the total amount of the fund
recovered or preserved), recovery should be limited to the amount
of the benefit.91
The common benefit theory, for these purposes, is merely a
corollary of the common fund principle; it expands the situations in
which the court has jurisdiction to award fees, but is grounded upon
the same principle of unjust enrichment. Thus, in Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank 92 the Supreme Court extended the unjust
enrichment rationale for awarding attorneys' fees to a case where
the plaintiff did not actually create a fund. The plaintiff in Sprague
successfully sued the bank to impress a lien upon the proceeds of
bonds that had been pledged as security for her trust deposits. In
so doing, she also established a similar lien for fourteen other trust
depositors who were similarly situated but not before the court.93
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld an award of her attorneys'
fees out of the proceeds of the bonds. The Court reasoned that
"the absence of an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as
it were, through stare decisis, rather than through a decree .
hardly touch[es] the power of equity in doing justice as between a
party and the beneficiaries of his litigation." 94
89 Text accompanying note 167 infra.
9 0 But see note 73 supra.
91 Dawson, supra note 75, at 851.
92307 U.S. 161 (1939).
93 Id. 163.
94 Id. 167. This oft-quoted language suggests that an attorney who represents
a client in a suit which enables plaintiffs in a separate suit to prevail through
stare decisis might be entitled to collect attorneys' fees from the plaintiffs of the
other suit. No court, however, has yet accepted the Supreme Court's invitation to
so extend the common benefit rationale. Dawson, supra note 75, at 917-18. Rather,
the common benefit rationale has been applied where the losing defendant in fact
was the beneficiary of the law suit; as in a shareholder derivative suit. See, e.g.,
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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The common benefit rationale reached full blossom in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co.95 Shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite brought
a stockholder derivative action against the corporation, successfully
establishing that its merger with another corporation had been
tainted by misleading proxy statements. Although there was no
monetary recovery, the Court held that it would be proper to
charge the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to the defendant corporation
because the corporation was in fact the beneficiary of the lawsuit.
The lower court's jurisdiction over the corporation, as in the case
of jurisdiction over a fund, permitted it to prevent the unjust
enrichment that would result if the real beneficiaries-all the share-
holders-were permitted to enjoy the benefits without incurring the
corresponding costs. The Court reasoned that
[t]he dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations was a
'deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group,' J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, [377 U.S. 426, 482 (1964)], and the expenses
of petitioners' lawsuit have been incurred for the benefit
of the corporation and the other shareholders.
To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who
has succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to
saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to
impose them on the class that has benefited from them and
that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.06
Thus, the common benefit rationale is simply a jurisdictional
extension of the common fund doctrine. It is not the court's
control over a fund which empowers it to prevent the unjust enrich-
ment; it is the court's jurisdiction over the defendant. 7 None-
theless, the claim of the plaintiff, and that of the attorneys, arise
from the same principle of unjust enrichment, and the measure of
their remedy-the litigation costs incurred by the plaintiff and the
market value of the attorneys' time and effort-is controlled by the
same principles that apply to the common fund situation.9s
95396 U.S. 375 (1970).
96 Id. 392, 396-97.
0 7 The Supreme Court indicated in Alyesk-a that it is proper to impose such an
extra-contractual obligation under the common benefit doctrines only where "[tihe
benefits [can] be traced with some accuracy, and there [is] reason for confidence
that the costs could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting."
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 n.39 (1975).
98 Nonetheless, courts have been no less inclined in common benefit cases than
in common fund cases to award attorneys' fees based upon the results achieved by
the lawsuit. At times this effort to quantify essentially intangible benefits has
bizarre consequences. In Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union v. Ratner,
1977]
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The final equitable rationale for imposing a fee obligation that
survives Alyeska is the bad faith doctrine. The courts may assess
attorneys' fees for "'willful disobedience of a court order . . as
part of the fine to be levied on the defendant' "99 or "when the
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.' "100 In most of the cases that have applied this
rationale, bad faith was found in the defendant's dilatory or obstruc-
tionist conduct during the litigation itself,'0 1 although there is au-
thority for awarding fees based upon the bad faith of the defendant's
conduct that gave rise to the litigation.
0 2
The bad faith rationale for awarding attorneys' fees is not based
upon an unjust enrichment principle. Rather, as the Supreme
Court has noted, "the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' in the
bad faith cases is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in
triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of 'bad faith'
on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." 103 Because the purpose of
the award is deterrence, it may be less important to protect litigants
against whom fees are assessed from unnecessarily high fee awards.
Nonetheless, as in the common fund and benefit cases, there does
not appear to be any sound justification for awarding the attorneys
more than the market value of their time and effort. It is the client
who has been injured by the other party's bad faith, not the attorney.
335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964), for example, the District of Columbia Circuit, in
awarding attorneys' fees to several union members who had successfully sued the
defendant union because of the misconduct of union officials, held that such fees
should be based upon the "value of the benefits [afforded] to the International and
its membership." Id. 697. Upon remand, the district court concluded that the
value of the successful lawsuit was the difference between honest and dishonest
union leadership. Moschetta v. Cross, 241 F. Supp. 347, 349-51 (D.D.C. 1964).
As a measurement of this benefit, the court awarded the attorneys 12.5% of the
average annual union dues paid by the membership. The court of appeals affirmed.
Ratner v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union, 354 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
99 421 U.S. at 258, quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
100 421 U.S. at 258-59, quoting F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
101 See, e.g., Red School House, Inc. v. OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1193-94
(D. Minn. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Miss.), aft'd, 489 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975); Sims
v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aft'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
102See, e.g., Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973);
Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp.
835, 853-57 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1320 (D.D.C.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
103 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
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As long as the attorney is compensated fully for all of his or her
time, including the extra time necessitated by the opposing party's
intransigence, it is difficult to perceive why counsel should receive a
windfall because of the adversary's bad faith.
B. Statutory Power
After Alyeska, in the absence of a common fund, a common
benefit, or bad faith, the federal courts do not have the power to
award attorneys' fees unless such authority has been specifically con-
ferred upon them by the federal statute under which the plaintiff
seeks relief. To date, at least seventy-five such statutory grants of
authority have been enacted by Congress.104 Almost all of these
1
0 4 See Federal Contested Elections Act § 17, 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1970); Act of
Nov. 21, 1974 (Freedom of Information Act amendments) § l(b)(2), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (4) (E) (Supp. V 1975); Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2)
(B) (Supp. V 1975); Government in the Sunshine Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(i)
(Supp. 1977); Workmen's Compensation Acts § 208, U.S.C. § 8127(b) (1970);
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 106, 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(f), (g)
(Supp. V 1975); Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 §309, 7 U.S.C. §210(f)
(1970); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 § 7, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499g(b),
(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1973); Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, § 6, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2305(a), (c) (1970); Plant Variety Protection Act § 125, 7 U.S.C. § 2565
(1970); Bankruptcy Act § 1, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205, 641, 643, 644 (1970); Home Owners
Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (8) (1970), as amended by Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 102(a), 80 Stat. 1036
(1966); National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1730(m), as amended by Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 102(a), 80 Stat. 1036
(1966); Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1786(o) (1970), as amended by
Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 1(3), 84 Stat. 1010 (1970); Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) (1970), as amended by Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 202, 80 Stat. 1036
(1966); Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 106(e), 12 U.S.C.
§ 2607(d) (Supp. V 1975); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Clayton Act
§ 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c (Supp. 1977), as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394; Clayton Act
§ 16, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1976), as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 302(3), 90 Stat. 1396; Federal Trade
Commission Act, 1975 Amendments § 202(a), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (Supp. V 1975);
Unfair Competition Act § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); Securities Act of 1933 § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 323, 15 U.S.C. § l7wwvv
(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a)
(1970); Jewelers' Liability Act (Gold and Silver Articles) § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 298
(b), (c), (d) (1970); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
§ 111, 15 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970); Truth in Lending Act § 408(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640
(a) (Supp. V 1975); Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 § 3, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1667b
(Supp. 1977); Fair Credit Reporting Act § 601, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(n), (o) (1970);
Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (Supp. V 1975), re-
designated as § 1691e(d) and amended by Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (1976); Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act §§ 109, 409, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1918, 1989(a) (2)
(Supp. V 1975); Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976
§§ 10(a), (b), 15 U.S.C.A. §§2059(e), 2060(c) (Supp. 1977); Consumer Product
Safety Act §§ 23, 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by
Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
1977"1
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statutory fee provisions confer the right to recover attorneys' fees
upon the parties themselves, rather than upon the attorneys.105
Most of these provisions leave the question whether to award at-
torneys' fees to the discretion of the court,1 6 although some make
the award of attorneys' fees a mandatory part of the statutory
remedy; 107 some authorize fee awards, in the discretion of the court,
94-284, §§ 10(c), (d), 90 Stat. 503 (1976); Hobby Protection Act § 3, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2102 (Supp. V 1975); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Improvement
Act §110(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d) (Supp. V 1975); Copyrights Act §1, 17
U.S.C. § 116 (1970), redesignated as § 505 and amended by Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 901(a), 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
§ 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970); Emergency School Aid Act § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617
(Supp. V 1975); American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964 § 5, 22
U.S.C. § 277d-21 (1970); International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 § 4, 64 Stat.
13 (1950) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f) (1970)); Act of June 25, 1948
(Federal Tort Claims), ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2678 (1970)); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970); Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, §6(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (Supp. V 1975);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)
(Supp. V 1975); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976 § 7(b),
31 U.S.C.A. § 1244(e) (Supp. 1977); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act Amendments of 1972 §§ 13, 15, 33 U.S.C. §§ 928, 933 (Supp. V
1975); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 §§ 505, 507, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1365(d), 1367(c) (Supp. V 1975); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (4) (Supp. V 1975); Deep-
water Port Act of 1974 § 16(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (Supp. V 1975); Patent
Infringement Act § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d),
42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (Supp. V 1975); Social Security Act § 206, 42 U.S.C. § 406
(1970); Clean Air Act § 12a, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975 § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (Supp. V 1975); Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1974 § 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1964 §§204, 706, 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-3(b), 2OOe-5(k) (1970); Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 2184 (1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 812,
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Crime Control Act of 1976 § 122(b), 42 U.S.C.A.
§3766(c)(4)(B) (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972 §12, 42 U.S.C. §4911(d)
(Supp. V 1975); National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of
1974 § 613, 42 U.S.C. § 5412(b) (Supp. V 1975); Railway Labor Act § 3, 45
U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Shipping Act, 1916 § 30, 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1970); Com-
munications Act of 1934 §§ 206, 407, 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 407 (1970); Act of Mar. 3,
1887 (aliens holding land) § 6, 48 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act
§§ 8, 16, 220, 308, 417, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 15(9), 16(2), 322(b), 908(b), 1917(b)
(1970); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976 § 8, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 1686e (1976); Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 205, 61 Stat. 199 (1947)
(repealed 1948); Defense Production Act of 1950, § 409, 64 Stat. 811 (1950)
(repealed 1951).
105 There are few exceptions. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (Supp. V 1975)
(in an administrative proceeding necessitated by employer's controversion of em-
ployee's workmen's compensation claim, reasonable attorneys' fees taxed against
unsuccessful employer and paid directly to the attorney).
106 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974 §3, 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1975); Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 § 6, 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970).
107 See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f)
(1970); Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 106(e), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1975 (1970).
[Vol. 126:281
ATTORNEYS' FEES
to either party. 08 Some allow them only to parties who have "pre-
vailed"' 09 or "substantially prevailed" 11O on the merits; several pro-
vide for fee awards "in the interests of justice;" I' a few provide for
fee awards only in "exceptional cases. 11 2  Almost all are statutory
exceptions to the American rule in that they provide for the taxation
of fees against the opposing party, in addition to any other relief
obtained.""
Although these statutory attorneys' fee provisions vary some-
what in their entitlement standards (the circumstances under which
a party is eligible for a fee award), they are virtually identical in
their language pertaining to the amount of the award where one is
appropriate. They provide that "reasonable" attorneys' fees should
be awarded. Moreover, they almost never attempt to define "reason-
able." 114
108 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (Supp. V 1975).
100 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act §§ 23, 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 3072
(Supp. V 1975), as amended by Consumer Product Safety Commission Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, §§ 10(c), (d), 90 Stat. 503 (1976).
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 § 7, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970);
Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970).
110 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1975); Freedom of Information Act Amendments § 1(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(4)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
111 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act §§ 22, 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073
(Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-284, §§ 10(c), (d), 90 Stat. 507
(1976).
112 See, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act § 125, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1970);
Patent Infringement Act § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970). The Fair Housing Act of
1968 § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970), provides that the court may award fees
to a prevailing plaintiff if, in the opinion of the court, the plaintiff is not financially
able to assume his or her attorneys' fees.
113 A few of the attorneys' fee provisions enable courts to award reasonable
attorneys' fees out of the recovery rather than from the opposing party. See
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 § 4, 64 Stat. 13 (1950) (current
version at 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f) (1970)); American-Mexican Chamizal Convention
Act of 1964 § 5, 22 U.S.C. § 277d-21 (1970); Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 984
(1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §2678 (1970)). These few exceptions
appear to proceed from a different premise than the other statutes in that they
exhibit a desire to control statutorily the amount that attorneys can recover from
their clients. For example, the American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of
1964 provides, in addition to the fee award, that it shall be a misdemeanor for
attorneys to charge their clients more than 10% of the award. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-21.
The other two statutes cited in this footnote have been amended to remove the fee
award provisions. They retain the fee limitations, however. See, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1623(f) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970). Thus, these provisions are not
statutory exceptions to the American rule at all, but rather are statutory controls
upon the contractual rights of attorneys and their clients.
114 Two recent enactments provide welcome exceptions to that general rule.
See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.A.
§2059(e)(4) (Supp. 1977); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of
1977]
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In determining the meaning and dimensions of "reasonable"
attorneys' fees under these statutes, the courts do not have unlimited
discretion. As with the interpretation of any other congressional
enactment, courts must apply this statutory language in the manner
that will best effectuate Congress' purpose. But while the courts
have at times looked to those purposes in deciding whether or not
they have authority to award a fee in a particular case,115 they rarely
set about the job of fee-setting with a similar appreciation of the
limitations upon their discretion.
Although for many of the statutory attorneys! fee provisions
little legislative history exists, it is clear from the legislative history
available that the fundamental purpose of these provisions is to
encourage full enforcement of the substantive rights to which they
are attached. The statutes are premised upon the proposition that
private enforcement is essential to the effectuation of the substantive
statutory scheme and that the award of attorneys' fees is essential to
effective private enforcement.
Congress explicitly expressed this purpose in connection with
one of its most recent enactments of an attorneys' fee provision-the
only instance in which Congress has enacted legislation dealing solely
with attorneys' fee awards. The House Committee on the Judiciary
explained the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976 "( as follows:
1976, § 8, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1686e (Supp. 1977). The Consumer Product Safety
Commission Improvement Act of 1976 provides:
[A] reasonable attorney's fee is a fee (A) which is based upon (i) the
actual time expended by an attorney in providing advice and other legal
services in connection with representing a person in an action brought
under this subsection, and (ii) such reasonable expenses as may be in-
curred by the attorney in the provision of such services, and (B) which is
computed at the rate prevailing for the provision of similar services with
respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding such fee .
15 U.S.C.A. §2059(e)(4) (Supp. 1977).
Although this formulation conforms in part to the approach suggested by this
Article, see text accompanying notes 140-72 infra, it does not account for the risk
of nonrecovery, see text accompanying notes 168-72 infra, and it leaves a certain
ambiguity regarding the prevailing rate to be applied. Hopefully, however, this
statutory interpretation of "reasonable" attorney fees-as far as it goes-will provide
some guidance to courts which must interpret provisions for reasonable attorneys'
fees found in other statutes. See note 104 supra.
115 Compare National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331
(1st Cir. 1973) with National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d
1351, 1356-58 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Wash-
ington, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359
(3d Cir. 1975).
11642 U.S.C.A. §1988 (Supp. 1977).
(Vol. 126:281
ATTORNEYS' FEES
The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights stat-
utes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens.
Although some agencies of the United States have civil
rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are
limited. In many instances where these laws are violated,
it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to
correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full
and complete, it will remain a meaningless right. Because
a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations can-
not afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their
cases to the courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable
attorney's fees, [the Act] is designed to give such persons
effective access to the judicial process where their griev-
ances can be resolved according to law." 7
Similarly, in its 1975 reenactment of the Voting Rights Act,1 8
Congress provided for a private right of action to enforce the Act
and authorized courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a pre-
vailing party. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained the pur-
pose of the amendments:
The amendment proposed by S. 1279 would authorize
courts to grant . . . relief to private parties in suits
brought to protect voting rights in covered and noncovered
jurisdictions. . . . In enacting remedial legislation, Con-
gress has regularly established a dual enforcement mecha-
nism. It has, on the one hand, given enforcement respon-
sibility to a governmental agency, and on the other, has
also provided remedies to private persons acting as a class
or on their own behalf. The Committee concludes that it
is sound policy to authorize private remedies to assist the
process of enforcing voting rights.
Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award
attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the
voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amend-
ments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. ...
Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases be-
cause there, as in employment and public accommodations
cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily
upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights in-
volved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling
private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights.
17 H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
11842 U.S.C. § 19731 (Supp. V 1975).
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In several hearings held over a period of years, the
Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the
Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which
[section 402 applies] are to be fully enforced. We find that
the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary and incident to
securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards
are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such
compliance.119
When applying these attorneys' fee statutes, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that their purpose is to encourage full enforcement
of the underlying statutory duties by assuring that, as a practical
matter, the private remedy for violation of those dudes will be
available to aggrieved persons. Interpreting the purposes of the
attorneys' fee provision of Tide II (public accommodations) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court explained:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was
evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the
Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation
as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. A
Title II suit is thus private in form only. When a plain-
tiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover
damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a "private attorney general,"
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to
"-9 S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 40-41 (1975) (footnote omitted).
See also S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267 (relating to Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments of 1974); S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916 (relating to Privacy Act Amendments of 1974);
S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5519 (relating to Bank Holding Company Act); H.R. REP. No.
1033, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (relating to Motor Vehicle Information Act);
H.R. REP. No. 928, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3592 (relating to Jewelers' Hall-Mark Act); H.R. REP. No. 159,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2719 (relating to Hobby Protection Act); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4639 (relating to
Employee Retirement Income Security Act); S. RE'. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 3668 (relating to Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972); S. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5356 (relating
to Clean Air Amendments of 1970).
A recent piece of legislative history pointedly discusses the Alyeska decision
and asserts that the fee provisions are being passed in part in response. H.R. REP.
No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 2572, 2588-90 (relating to Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976).
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bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would
be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking
the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress there-
fore enacted the provisions for counsel fees-not simply to
penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they
know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage in-
dividuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief under Title//.120
Based upon the legislative history and judicial interpretation of
these attorneys' fee provisions, it is evident that Congress had two
related objectives. First, it sought to achieve the fullest possible
voluntary compliance with the statutory duties imposed by provid-
ing a private remedy that is readily available. In this sense the
attorneys' fee provisions act as a deterrent to noncompliance. As
former Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson explained in sup-
port of such provisions in the Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments: "Enforcement provisions are needed . . . to create a strong
and reliable incentive to overcome the initial bureaucratic resistance
to change that might otherwise prove to be a crucial obstacle to the
prompt and full achievement of fair information practice." 121
Second, the availability of an award of attorneys' fees enables those
who have been aggrieved by a violation of the statute to vindicate
their rights, both for themselves and, acting as private attorneys
general, for others similarly situated. In this sense the attorneys'
fees provisions have the avowed purpose of encouraging litigation
120Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)
(emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) ("under some, if not most, of the
statutes providing for the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted to rely
heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees
so as to encourage private litigation." Id.); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412
U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
121S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6916, 6942. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 407 F. Supp. 380, 387 (D.D.C. 1975) (a post-Alyesk-s decision con-
struing § 7701 of the Veterans Preference Act to allow awards of attorneys, fees
despite lack of specific Congressional authorization). The Fitzgerald court reasoned
that:
It is particularly in such cases that the need for attorneys' fees is greatest,
lest government officials such as the ones involved here be free to harass
or victimize disfavored employees, secure in the knowledge that the em-
ployee will either be wholly unable to stand up for his or her rights because
of the staggering cost of the prospective fees involved, or, even if the
employees is especially courageous and tenacious, will be left with a
legal bill which to virtually all federal employees would be financially
catastrophic.
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by those who are injured under the statute.12 2 Moreover, they pro-
vide more equal access to judicial remedies for those protected by
the statute. They proceed from the assumption that the wealth of
the victim should not determine his or her capability to enforce the
particular rights conferred. As Senator Strom Thurmond argued in
support of the attorneys' fee provision of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Amendments:
We must insure that the average citizen can take ad-
vantage of the law to the same extent as the giant corpora-
tions with large legal staffs. Often the average citizen has
foregone the legal remedies supplied by the Act because he
has had neither the financial nor legal resources to pursue
litigation when his Administrative remedies have been
exhausted.1
23
In short, statutory attorneys' fee provisions are intended to
achieve the fullest possible enforcement of the congressional policy
embodied in the underlying statutory scheme. Reasonable attor-
neys' fees under these statutes are those which will best achieve that
purpose. In fixing fees under these statutory attorneys' fee pro-
visions, however, the courts have applied widely varying measures
of reasonableness. A recent unpublished survey of one hundred
forty district court cases involving attorneys' fees illustrates this
pattern. 2 4  While the mean hourly rate awarded by courts under
the fee provisions of the private antitrust statutes was $181 in the
cases surveyed, the mean hourly rate awarded in the Title VII (em-
ployment discrimination) cases surveyed was $40.125 A general re-
view of the reported decisions inescapably confirms the conclusion
that statutory fee awards under civil rights, environmental, con-
122 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263
(1975); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 719 n.27 (1974);
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); Hairston v. R & R
Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1975); Clark v. American Marine Corp.,
320 F. Supp. 709, 710-11 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972) (standing
to sue under § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970),
granted based on private attorney general rationale).
.23S . REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
124 Helfman, "Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: A Statistical Survey of One
Hundred and Forty Recent District Court Cases Involving Attorneys' Fees," (Project
Submitted to the Faculty of Antioch School of Law, 1975).
125 Id. 182. This same discrepancy is evident when awards in all the com-
mercial cases surveyed are compared with the awards in all civil rights cases
surveyed. In the former category, the mean hourly rate awarded was $93; for the
civil rights cases, that rate was $38. Id.
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sumer, and government information access statutes have been sub-
stantially lower than awards under antitrust, securities, and other
fee statutes involving commercial rights.
This variation reflects a view, explicitly taken by many courts,
126
that statutory fee awards in civil rights, environmental, consumer,
and information access cases should be lower than statutory awards
in more traditional private commercial litigation. This "public
interest discount" has been justified by the courts on the ground
that attorneys have a professional responsibility to represent im-
pecunious clients and nonpecuniary causes and, therefore, they
should not expect to receive the same compensation when they
undertake such cases. As one court noted:
A member of the legal profession has the obligation to
represent clients who are unable to pay for counsel and also
to bring suits in the public interest. While embarking
upon their duties, they should not be motivated by a desire
for profit but by public spirit and sense of duty.
127
This view, however, and the resulting variation in statutory fee
awards between private commercial cases and public interest cases,
has several inherent problems. First, courts simply do not have the
authority to assign relative priorities to the statutes Congress itself
has selected for enforcement incentives. The respective legislative
histories of the private antitrust and Title VII statutes, for example,
contain no suggestion that the policies embodied in the former are
of greater importance, or deserve more vigorous enforcement in-
centives, than the policies of the latter. Yet the practical effect of
awarding fees in private antitrust cases that are four to five times
higher than those awarded in Title VII cases is to make private
antitrust cases financially more attractive to the legal profession,
thereby creating an economic distinction that is likely to affect the
allocation of legal resources between these types of litigation.
It is precisely this kind of judicial activity that the Supreme
Court rejected in Alyeska. The Court held that the judiciary did
not have the power to select from the wide range of national policies
those which were of such overriding importance that attorneys' fees
should be awarded to encourage their enforcement. The Court
126 See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (1st Cir.), vacated
and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338-39 (1st Cir. 1973).
127 Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1253 (D. Kan. 1974).
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held that such a determination is a legislative one. 28 Simi-
larly, if private antitrust enforcement is to be given stronger in-
centives than the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes, that
judgment must come from Congress, not the courts. In the absence
of such a congressional signal, courts are constrained to apply a single
standard of reasonableness.
129
The "public interest discount" suffers from yet another faulty
premise. Statutory fee provisions are not enacted for the benefit of
lawyers; rather, they are enacted for the benefit of the class of per-
sons protected by the statutes. They seek to assure that sufficient
legal resources will be available to enforce fully the rights conferred
and that the potential litigants' means will not affect his or her
ability to vindicate those statutory rights. Reducing the fees awarded
on the ground that lawyers should be inspired by their sense of civic
responsibility reduces the economic attractiveness of such cases,
thereby restricting the supply of legal resources made available. It
is little consolation to a victim of illegal job discrimination, who
cannot find a lawyer willing to accept the reduced fees courts often
award in Title VII cases, that the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility states that there ought to be a lawyer who will take the case
at less than the normal fee.
13 0
There are several ironies in the reasoning behind the "public
interest discount." First, it invokes the interests of the disadvan-
taged to justify a policy contrary to their interests. Deflating fee
awards because the class of persons protected by a statute is im-
poverished tends to reduce the number of attorneys attracted to
vindicating the rights of others similarly situated. Second, it affects
lawyers in inverse relationship to their charitable commitment.
Those lawyers who engage in no public interest legal representation
whatsoever are unaffected by judicial admonitions that virtue is its
own reward. Finally it has the anomalous effect of placing a lower
value on certain cases because they admittedly serve a broader public
interest.1 1
128 See 421 U.S. at 269.
129 This view was recently suggested by the House Judiciary Committee in
connection with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. Comparing civil
rights cases to private antitrust cases, the committee stated that "civil rights plaintiffs
should not be singled out for different and less favorable treatment." H.R. REP.
No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
18 0 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, ETICAL CONSIDERATION
2-24, 2-25 (1969).
11 Several courts have seized upon the $20-$30 hourly fee schedule provided
for appointed criminal cases under the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act, 18
U.S.C. 3006A(d)(1) (1970), as the appropriate rate to award fees in civil public
interest cases. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisano, 512 F.2d 1137, 1141 (1st Cir. 1975),
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The tendency of many courts to set fee awards below the
market value of a lawyer's services in certain types of public interest
cases may reflect the development over the past decade of the public
interest law movement. Public interest lawyers generally have fore-
gone the more lucrative pursuits of their profession to serve clients
or causes that cannot or do not secure representation through the
normal market mechanisms. Although these public interest lawyers
have had a visible impact in recent years,13 2 they are literally few
and far between. The most comprehensive survey to date identified
approximately six hundred public interest lawyers practicing in
ninety public interest law centers around the country,133 compared
with the private bar of about 400,000 lawyers.1'3 The services of the
pro bono bar, which is concentrated in the eastern urban centers,
135
simply is not available to most people.
13
To achieve full enforcement of the private rights created by
statutes which include attorneys' fee provisions, the resources of the
private bar must be brought to bear. But the supply of free or
reduced-fee legal services available from the private bar is also ex-
tremely limited; for any particular potential litigant, its availability
is largely fortuitous. A random sampling of 1450 lawyers conducted
in 1973-1974 revealed that the average lawyer spends only about 27
vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Red House School v. OEO, 386 F.
Supp. 1177, 1199 (D. Minn. 1974); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities
Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp.
834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Pro-
fessor Dawson has endorsed this view. See Dawson, supra note 75, at 906. In
addition to the other reasons for rejecting a "public interest discount" approach,
text accompanying notes 126-31 supra, it should also be noted that attorneys who
undertake cases under the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act enjoy a more or less
guaranteed volume of cases by a simple trip to the courthouse. Moreover, fees
under the Act are available regardless of the outcome of the representation. The
fees were fixed nearly seven years ago, have not been adjusted for inflation, see
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1) (1970), and can be soundly criticized as inadequate even
for the limited purpose they serve. They certainly are an inappropriate guideline
for other types of cases.
132 See CouNcH. ron PuBc INEEST L-W, supra note 56, at 165-215.
133 Id. 3.
134Id. 165. The limited resources available to the public through public
interest lawyers is further reflected in the $40 million total budget for 1975 for all
tax-exempt public interest law centers compared with the $11 billion annual gross
receipts of the private bar. Id. 5, 53.
135 Id. 80.
136 The government-funded legal services program is a significant source of
free legal representation for those with incomes of less than 125% of the poverty
level as set by the Office of Management and Budget. Those services, however,
are simply not available for the vast majority of Americans who are above that
minimal income level.
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hours of nonbillable time a year on pro bono work and that the
bulk of this time is devoted to matters that do not involve litiga-
tion. 37 To achieve Congress' goal of giving all aggrieved persons
the opportunity to enforce certain statutory rights requires that the
economic interests of the legal profession be activated. As a re-
sult, public interest cases must be placed on a comparable financial
footing with the competing demands for legal services, which com-
pensate attorneys at the full market value for their services. If this
means that lawyers will receive fee awards somewhat higher than
those a more public spirited bar might accept, so be it. In the
context of statutory fee awards, lawyers are necessary instruments to
achieve national policies established by Congress.
It might be argued that full enforcement 138 of statutory rights
could be accomplished by awarding something less than the full
market value of attorneys' services because there is unused capacity
in the legal system. Unemployed and underemployed lawyers, for
example, presumably would be willing to take on additional work
at something less than their standard rate. It is undoubtedly true
that as the "earnings gap" (the difference between the maximum
return for a particular lawyer's time and the return on these cases)
decreases, more and more lawyers will be attracted to them. There
are nevertheless a number of reasons why it would be unwise for
courts to use this rationalization for awarding fees at less than full
market rates.
First, there is no way for the courts to determine the point at
which fee awards at something less than full market rates will make
available sufficient legal resources to enforce these statutes to the
fullest extent possible. Indeed, that point, if it exists at all, may
vary from one substantive field of law to another. Thus courts
would either be drawn into a morass of supply and demand analysis
or revert to arbitrary determinations, which should be avoided.
Second, there is no indication that Congress intended that the
enforcement of these important national policies should rely upon
unemployed or underemployed lawyers. Effective enforcement,
'37 Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities
of Private Practice Lawyers, 61 A.B.A.J. 1388, 1389 (1975).
138 It is obviously impossible to measure the extent of the unmet need for legal
services in the particular areas covered by these statutes since there is no way to
calculate rights not vindicated or suits not brought. Every indication, however, is
that it is substantial. A survey of the legal needs of the public conducted by a
special committee of the A.B.A., for example, found that of the respondents who
indicated that they had suffered from a discriminatory denial of a job or promotion,
only 1.1% had used a lawyer in the most recent occurrence of such discrimination.
B. CuRsu& & F. SPALDiNc, TnE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PuBrac 83 (1974).
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particularly in more difficult and complex cases, requires the serv-
ices of experienced attorneys, who are less likely to be under-
employed. Although there are approximately 400,000 lawyers in
the United States, the pool of potential legal resources for these
purposes is far smaller. As a practical matter, most lawyers are not
available for these cases because of their lack of interest in or ex-
perience with litigation, and due to their specialization in other
areas of the law. Moreover, even if the risk of nonrecovery is taken
into account in setting the market value of the lawyer's services, 39
many lawyers simply are unwilling to work on a contingency basis,
with the attendant uncertainty and burden of uncompensated costs
during the pendency of a case, which may be unresolved for several
years. In short, even if there are some additional legal resources
available at less than their full market value, the concerns for ful
enforcement and objectivity in fee awards support the determination
of such awards based upon full market rates.
It appears, therefore, that the courts do not have quite as much
discretion in setting "reasonable" attorneys' fees under statutory fee
provisions as many have assumed. They must set fees in a manner
that will satisfy the congressional purpose of achieving the fullest
possible enforcement of the underlying statute. Furthermore, in
the absence of a congressional mandate to the contrary, fees must be
awarded in a manner that does not discriminate on the basis of the
particular statutory right being enforced.
These goals can be accomplished, and at the same time a far
more objective approach to fee setting can be achieved, by com-
pensating lawyers for the time and effort they have reasonably
expended at the full market rate for their services. The attorneys'
fee statutes necessarily reflect the judgment of Congress that the
charity of the bar is inadequate. Yet by awarding fees at less than
the full market value of the particular attorney's services, the courts
have not eliminated the necessity for depending upon legal charity;
they have merely reduced the amount that must be made up by
such contributions.
IV. FEE DETERMINATIONS BASED ON MARKET VALUE
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that regardless
of whether the court is proceeding under its equity power or pur-
suant to statutory authority, a "reasonable" attorneys' fee is one
that compensates lawyers for the full market value of their time and
139 See text accompanying notes 168-72 infra.
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effort. Such a determination can never be reduced to a neat
mathematical formula; it involves important matters of judgment.
It is grounded, however, upon a series of factual determinations
that, as many courts have recognized, should be the subject of a
separate evidentiary hearing.14 It entails consideration of most of
the factors listed by various courts, 141 but within an analytical frame-
work that reflects private, time-based fee-setting.142
A. Time Reasonably Expended
As discussed above,143 the unjust enrichment rationale of fee
awards under the equitable theories requires that the time expended
by the attorneys, rather than the results achieved, be the basis of the
fee determination in such cases. Considerations of policy lead to
the same conclusion in the statutory cases. Many of the statutes
that provide for fee awards do not give rise to monetary recov-
eries.14 It is virtually impossible in such cases to translate the
results of the lawsuit into quantitative terms. How does a court
determine the monetary value of desegregated education, or the
right to vote, or access to government information? Any attempt
to quantify the results of such cases, and to reward the attorneys
based even in part upon such determinations, is necessarily an
arbitrary exercise.14 Yet to award attorneys' fees only in cases that
140 The Supreme Court indicated that, in the context of fee awards under § 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970) (per curiam). A number
of courts have recognized that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever facts
pertaining to the fee award are in dispute. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 322 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Honeybrook
Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971). The lower court should be required to state its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 505 F.2d 105,
109 (6th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 169-170 (3d Cir. 1973).
141 See text accompanying notes 172-177 infra.
142 Fees are also set in the marketplace on the basis of a contingent percentage
of the recovery; however, private fee arrangements which proceed on that basis
are not an appropriate model for courts to use in setting fees. See text accompany-
ing notes 83-89 supra, 143-52 infra.
143 See text accompanying notes 72-98 supra.
'
4 4 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per
curiam) (discussing Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
145 The difficulty in attempting to measure quantitatively the benefits of in-
junctive relief, even in private antitrust actions, is well-illustrated by the Third
Circuit's effort to do so in Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.
1975). Because the Third Circuit had taken the position that a time-based fee
award should be adjusted, inter alia, to reflect the recovery obtained, see Lindy
Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1973), it felt compelled to remand the fee question in Merola for a determina-
tion of the monetary value of a settlement that required the oil company defendant
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produce monetary recoveries is to engage in precisely the discrim-
inatory priority setting that is beyond the authority of the courts.46
Even where there is a monetary recovery, "[a]nchoring the
analysis [to time expended] is the only way of approaching the
problem that can claim objectivity." 147 How does a court decide
whether the attorney should receive 5% or 25% or 26% of the
recovery? As we have seen,148 the wide range of choices that courts
have made, even in similar cases, strongly suggests the essentially
arbitrary nature of "percentage picking." The difference of even
a single percentage of a large recovery, however, can have a sub-
stantial impact upon the fee recovery.149  There can be no
rational justification for the ensuing windfall or loss based solely
on the court's arbitrary selection of a convenient percentage.
Moreover, the premises implicit in awarding attorneys' fees
based upon a percentage of the recovery, inflating the hourly rate
based upon results, or awarding a bonus based upon the result,
are questionable. Such a practice assumes a direct relationship
between the size of the recovery and the attorneys' efforts, which is
not always the case. As one court has noted, "[a] point is reached
where the amount of the plaintiff's recovery is unrelated to services
of counsel. The large amounts involved do not add to the com-
plexity of the problems, increase the responsibilities of counsel or
require greater capabilities of counsel." 180 Even in cases involving
smaller recoveries, damages may follow directly once liability is
established, with as much skill and effort required to produce the
first dollar as the last. No court has yet suggested that where an
attorney recovers less than expected, a part of the pre-arranged fee
should be refunded to the client.151
to alter its service station leasing policy to lengthen the guaranteed period of the
dealers' leases. The court of appeals described the benefit it sought to be quantified
as the 'limitation of opportunities for coercion." 515 F.2d at 170.
1
4
6 See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
147 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974).
148 See note 34 supra.
149 The problem is no different analytically if the court seeks to reward the
attorney for the results achieved by inflating the hourly rate by some multiplier,
or by adding a bonus to the regular fee based upon the recovery. The court is
still faced with the arbitrary task of deciding the appropriate relationship of the fee
to the recovery.
150 TWA v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on
other grounds, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363
(1973).
151 The difficulties in attributing the results to the attorneys' efforts are further
compounded by the presence of co-counsel or several law firms representing various
plaintiffs, as will often be the case in complex class action cases. See, e.g., City
of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Two other considerations argue against fee awards based upon
results even in statutory cases. Unlike the common fund situation,
attorneys' fees in statutory cases are not paid out of the recovery.
Rather, they are taxed against the defendant in addition to any
other judgment against him. The damage recovery reflects the
court's measurement of the legal wrong to the plaintiff. But the
defendant has not violated any duties to the plaintiff's attorneys.
The statute imposes upon the unsuccessful party the obligation to
pay for the wrong done to the plaintiffs, as prescribed by the statute,
plus a sufficient attorneys' fee to provide the necessary enforcement
incentive. It does not impose upon the defendant the obligation to
pay, for example, 120%0 of the statutorily appropriate damages so
that the attorney can share in the consequences of defendant's
wrong to the plaintiff.
Finally, awarding attorneys' fees based upon results funda-
mentally misconceives the role of the lawyer. A lawsuit is not an
investment in a uranium mine in which the lawyer is a co-venturer.
Rather it is an attempt by the plaintiff to obtain redress for a legal
injury. To this endeavor attorneys contribute their time, advocacy
skills, and professional judgment-not their capital. Fully com-
pensating the attorneys for the time they have invested is therefore
not only sufficient to provide the necessary incentives, but addi-
tionally is consistent with the function of lawyers to bring dis-
interested professional judgment to their cause.152
152 Fee calculations based upon results have been justified by some based upon
a different conception of the lawyer's work. As one court stated: "The value of a
lawyer's services is not merely measured by time or labor. The practice of law is
an art in which success depends as much as in any other art on the application of
imagination-and sometimes inspiration-to the subject matter." Arenson v. Board
of Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (citation omitted). The
leading proponent of this view has been Professor George Hornstein who has argued
for awards based on the percentage of recovery. See Horstein, Legal Therapeutics:
The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HAv. L. REv. 658 (1956).
Professor Hornstein argues that "[olne thousand plodding hours may be far less
productive than one imaginative, brilliant hour. A surgeon who skillfully performs
an appendectomy in seven minutes is entitled to no smaller fee than one who takes
an hour; many a patient would think he is entitled to more." Id. 660.
Several things can be said in response to these arguments. Although it is true
that a thousand plodding hours may be less productive than one brilliant hour, the
thousand plodding hours are usually a prerequisite to the single brilliant one. In
any case, to the extent one lawyer is more creative or efficient than another, that
will ultimately be reflected in his or her market rate. As for the analogy to the
deft surgeon (putting aside the question whether the ,pricing mechanisms of the
medical profession are the model to which we should aspire), the relationship
between time expended and the benefits provided is far more tenuous in medicine
than law, particularly in the subprofession Professor Hornstein has chosen for his
illustration. It might be added that surgeons receive their fee, albeit occasionally
from someone other than the patient, whether or not the operation.is successful.
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The starting point for calculating a fee that compensates the
attorney for the value of his or her time and effort is a determina-
tion of the number of hours justifiably expended. A court is not
bound by the claim asserted by the lawyer. Many courts have
properly recognized their obligation to scrutinize the hours sub-
mitted by the attorney to assure that the time expended was not
unnecessarily duplicative, or indeed, not expended at all.153 As one
court noted that "[t]he Court may discount the number of hours
counsel has submitted in its logs, if the Court determines, based
upon the facts, circumstances and legal issues in the case, that the
hours expended were unnecessary, unrelated or involved duplica-
tion of activity." 15
Several considerations should be borne in mind by the courts
in reviewing the hours submitted by the lawyers. Several courts
have engaged in wholesale markdowns of the time asserted with little
or no explanation of why time was disallowed.1r5 The purpose of
judicial review is to assure that the time claimed was in fact ex-
pended and was necessary to a vigorous prosecution of the claim.
It is not a device for discounting the fee award on other grounds.
Thus, to avoid any suspicion that review is being used to pursue
unrelated ends, and to give guidance-both to the lawyers who are
before the court and to those who are not-as to precisely why the
claim was excessive, courts should specify with particularity the
hours that are disallowed. The courts should also allow hours ex-
pended on unsuccessful claims, unless they are clearly frivolous.
153 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717
(5th Cir. 1974) (court refused to compensate attorneys for time spent by two or
three lawyers in the courtroom when one would have sufficed); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382
F. Supp. 999, 1004-14 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
This will, of course, require that attorneys keep complete and well-documented time
records. Several courts have refused to compensate time for which there was no
detailed records. See, e.g., In re Meade Land & Development Co., 527 F.2d 280,
284 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Roustabout Co., 386 F.2d 354, 355 (3d Cir. 1967) (per
curiam). The consequence of inadequate time records is illustrated by Davis v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 526 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1976), a school desegregation
case in which the court, disallowing some of the time asserted by the attorneys,
cited as an example of excessiveness twenty-six hours spent by two attorneys "review-
ing a seven line order of this court denying a stay pending application for certiorari
to the Supreme Court." Id. 868-69 n.3. It is, of course, possible to imagine how
twenty-six hours could be justifiably expended in reviewing the legal and strategic
consequences of a denial of such a stay; however, the attorneys' failure to specify
how they spent that time gave the court no basis for concluding that it was
necessary.
154 United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. United States, 61 F.R.D. 13, 19 n.16
(D.D.C. 1973).
155 See note 41 supra.
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Although several courts have not followed this course in cases
brought under the antitrust statutes,156 nothing in the language of
the statutes compels this result. 57 On the contrary, as one court
has noted, "courts should not require attorneys (often working in
new or changing areas of the law) to divine the exact parameters
of the courts' willingness to grant relief." '5s Courts should be
wary of interfering too deeply in the strategic judgments made by
a litigator. Time should be disallowed only if it reflects duplica-
tion, padding, gross overstaffing, or if it was spent on clearly friv-
olous claims. 59
156 Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1100 (D. Md.
1969); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 218 F. Supp. 490,
491-92 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1971); Osborn v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Md. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 324
F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873,
878-79 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); TWA v. Hughes,
312 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1971), re'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
157 The Clayton Act, for example, merely provides that a person injured under
the antitrust laws shall recover "threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
158 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd,
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977). In a recent Title VII case, the court, which granted
relief to the plaintiff on one of his eight counts, rejected the contention of the
defendant that the fee award should be similarly prorated, pointing out that "the
policy underlying the fee provisions of Title VII is best served by encouraging
plaintiffs to seek the broadest relief they feel, in good faith, they are entitled to."
Palmer v. Rogers, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. II 10,499 at 6130 (D.D.C. 1975) (citation
omitted).
159 Most courts which have considered the question have recognized the right
to recover attorneys' fees for the time spent litigating the fee issue itself, both to
prevent the defendant from effectively defeating enforcement of the statute by
erecting costly barriers to the fee recovery and to enable the court to make its
determination of fees on the basis of a full examination of the facts. See, e.g.,
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1975); Miller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974), af'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977). But see Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1974) (time spent on fee application in a common
fund case disallowed). Courts also have generally awarded compensation for time
spent on appellate proceedings. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S.
222, 223 (1970) (per curiam); Ward v. Kelly, 515 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1975).
The Supreme Court has noted that "[tlhe amount of the award for [appellate]
services should, as a general rule, be fixed in the first instance by the District
-Court." Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). But see note 69 supra & accompanying text.
Finally, even where courts are acting pursuant to statutes which permit awards
only to "prevailing" parties, the district court has discretion to award fees "incident
to the final disposition of interim matters." Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
723 (1974). The Supreme Court suggested in Bradley that "the entry of any
order that determines substantial rights of the parties may be an appropriate occa-
sion upon which to consider the propriety of an award of counsel fees....- Id.
722-23 n.28. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970).
Such a practice recently was endorsed, in appropriate circumstances, by the House
Judiciary Committee in connection with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
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B. The Hourly Rate
The court must determine a value for the attorney's time that
will place statutory fee cases on a competitive economic basis and
that will compensate attorneys in equitable fee cases for the loss
sustained in creating the appropriated benefit. For lawyers engaged
in customary private practice, who at least in part charge their
clients on an hourly basis regardless of the outcome, the marketplace
has set that value. For these attorneys, the best evidence of the
value of their time is the hourly rate which they most commonly
charge their fee-paying clients for similar legal services. This rate
reflects the training, background, experience, and previously demon-
strated skill of the individual attorney in relation to other lawyers
in that community.
Special factors in a particular case may affect the rate an attor-
ney charges a private, fee-paying client; correspondingly, it is ap-
propriate for the court to account for the presence of such unusual
circumstances when it is setting the fee. Thus, if the lawyer is sig-
nificantly departing from his or her field of expertise, a lower rate
may be justified.160 Unusual time constraints reasonably imposed
by the case or the client may push the rate upward. The impact of
a particular representation on the lawyer's practice may influence
the rate-one way or the other. A particularly unpopular cause may
risk the loss of other clients, warranting a higher rate, while a case's
potential to attract future business may warrant charging the client
less. To the extent any of these factors are present in a case requir-
ing the court to fix a fee, the best evidence of how the marketplace
would account for the presence of such a factor is to look to in-
stances where the particular lawyer was faced with similar circum-
stances in private practice. In the absence of such experience, the
court can look to the experience of other lawyers similarly situated
in the community. 161
Act of 1976. The Committee stated that "[sluch awards pendente lite are par-
ticularly important in protracted litigation, where it is difficult to predicate [sic]
with any certainty the date upon which a final order will be entered." H.R. EP.
No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
160 Lawyers engaged in a litigation practice ordinarily do not vary their rates
to fee-paying clients depending upon the subject matter of the litigation. A lawyer
who specializes in tax planning, however, would ordinarily not be able to charge a
client for litigating a non-tax matter at the rate which reflects his or her tax planning
skill and experience. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
161 The burden of proof on market rate, as in the case of other issues involved
in setting a fee, rests with the petitioner-the plaintiff in most statutory cases and
the lawyer in most common fund or benefit cases. To sustain that burden the
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In valuing the time expended, there is no reason why the de-
fendant in a statutory case, or the nonclient beneficiaries in a fund
case, should support "overlawyered" lawsuits. If some of the activi-
ties involved in the litigation manifestly could have been conducted
by a lawyer with less experience, or even by a paralegal, the court is
justified in compensating that time at a reduced rate.162  To the
extent that activities such as research, routine pleading or motion
preparation, brief or memorada writing, or document and transcript
review could have been performed by a less experienced lawyer, the
court can compensate this time at the market rate for a more junior
attorney. Some activities, such as settlement administration or docu-
ment abstracting, may be compensable at the prevailing market rate
for paralegal time. The administration of justice would not be well
served, however, by a judicial determination of the precise skill level
required for each hour asserted. 163 Broad categories should suffice.
In determining the value of the attorney's time, a somewhat
different situation is presented when the attorney does not have a
customary hourly rate set by the competitive marketplace. This
will be the case when the attorney's normal practice is the contin-
gent fee arrangement, or when the lawyer regularly provides legal
services on a noneconomic basis. This latter group would include
a salaried attorney for a litigating organization or an attorney who
ordinarily subsidizes otherwise unrepresented clients and causes by
charging less than demonstrably could be obtained for the services
were the lawyer to act in a more "economically rational" manner.
In such cases, the purposes underlying fee awards can best be
fulfilled by basing the fee upon the full market value of the legal
lawyers involved can submit their own affidavits setting forth the hours expended
on each activity and, for those lawyers who have an hourly rate set by the market-
place, the rate most commonly charged for similar professional services. Where the
attorney does not have a rate established by the marketplace, affidavits from other
lawyers of similar skill and experience in the community should be submitted.
Judicial expertise will obviate the need for expert testimony on this question. See,
e.g., Tranberg v. Tranberg, 456 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1972).
162 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir.
1974); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410
F. Supp. 680, 695 (D. Minn. 1975); National Council of Community Mental Health
Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub noma. National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v.
Mathews, 546 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Weinberger, supra, the court noted
in the context of a fee determination in a case handled by a sole practitioner that
"his work was at many different gradations of professional responsibility and no
flat rate can reasonably be applied to his work as a whole." 387 F. Supp. at 996.
In more complex cases, staffed by a team of lawyers with varying levels of experi-
ence, the actual time spent by each lawyer will ordinarily reflect more nearly the
skill required.
163 See Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1976).
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services provided.164 In the statutory fee award case, where the
objective is full enforcement of the underlying substantive right, a
market value fee award to a nonprofit litigating organization or a
reduced profit public interest lawyer simply enables such resources
to be made more widely available to others who wish to assert the
same rights. Even if the private bar is compensated at market rates
for such cases, these litigating organizations and public interest
lawyers will continue to provide the specialization, freedom from
conflicts with private clients, readiness to take on unpopular causes,
and willingness to carry the costs of protracted cases that is indis-
pensible to full enforcement.
This result involves no unfairness to the defendant against
whom fees are assessed; as between defendants, the identity and the
fee arrangements of the plaintiffs' attorneys are totally fortuitous.165
It would, however, be fundamentally unfair to award fees based
upon full market rates to attorneys who ordinarily seek to maximize
their economic return-a result which is essential to enlist their
services based upon economic self-interest-while at the same time
awarding something less than full market value to attorneys who
forego some of their earning capacity by representing clients who
cannot afford adequate representation. To do so is to penalize those
attorneys for their public spiritedness. It seems clear that Congress
intended that cases arising under statutes with fee provisions were
to be removed from the charity rolls, regardless of the identity of
the attorney. As one court stated: "Congress certainly intended any
award under the statute to be reasonable by traditional standards.
It did not look, like Lear's jester, to the breath of the unfeed [sic]
lawyer, but considered that the prevailing litigant should be able to
pay the laborer the worth of his hire." 166
164 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317,
322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., 517 F.2d
1141, 1147-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090,
1092-93 (7th Cir. 1975); Wilderness Socty v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), 'ev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th
Cir. 1974). But see Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220-21 (1st Cir. 1974) (court
awarded attorneys' fees to the private attorney while denying an award of fees to
New Hampshire Legal Assistance because "[t]he policy of encouraging future
representation was secured by the award [to the private attorney]." Id. 221.
165 See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338
n.7 (1st Cir. 1973).
166 Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970),
aff'd 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971). For an expression of similar views, see Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Congress did not
intend that vindication of statutorily guaranteed rights would depend on . . . the
availability of legal assistance from charity-individual, collective or organized."
Id. 539).
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The attorney is entitled to "the worth of his hire" under the
equitable rationales as well, regardless of what, if anything, the client
has agreed to pay or whether the lawyer sometimes or always pro-
vides legal representation at less than its full market value. To the
extent that the fee obligation of the client is less than the full market
value of the lawyer's services, the lawyer is sustaining a loss that is
compensable under an unjust enrichment principle. The measure
of that loss, and the extent of the beneficiaries unjust enrichment,
is the difference between what the lawyer could have charged for the
time and any fee received. The fact that in other situations the
lawyer does not charge all that he or she could does not alter the fact
that the opportunity to sell the time devoted to that particular case
at its full market value has been lost.
1 67
In order to establish a market value for the services of a lawyer
who does not have an hourly rate set by the marketplace, it is neces-
sary to look to the rate charged by comparable attorneys who do.
That is not to say that every such lawyer is entitled to the highest
rate for legal services in the community, or even the highest rate
charged by his or her contemporaries. Rather, it will be necessary
for a lawyer so situated to demonstrate the prevailing rate in the
community for lawyers of similar experience, professional back-
ground, reputation, and skill who are engaged in cases of similar
magnitude and complexity.
C. The Risk of Nonrecovery
Unless an attorney has some agreement with the client guar-
anteeing compensation regardless of the outcome, the attorney will
receive no fee in the event that the suit does not succeed in some
manner.' 68  In these cases counsel bear the risk that they will not
be compensated at all for their time and effort. The experience
of the marketplace indicates that lawyers generally will not provide
167 The attorney is entitled to no more than the full market value of his or her
time and effort. Thus, where the attorney receives a contractual fee from his client
which represents the reasonable value of his or her services, "[tihe fee [award]
would go [initially] to the attorneys, who would then reimburse their client."
National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
However, where counsel has represented the client at a reduced rate because of his
or her belief that the case furthers the public interest, "the District Court should
award [the attorneys] such additional amounts [above what they received from their
client] as are necessary to bring the compensation up to reasonable value." Id. 323.
168 Under the equitable theories, there can be no fee award unless a fund is
created, recovered or preserved, or a benefit is conferred. Most of the attorneys'
fee statutes authorize or require fee awards only to a party who has in some manner
prevailed, either through judgment, settlement, or voluntary compliance by the
other party. See H.R. BEP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-8 (1976).
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legal representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a
premium for taking that risk. Ordinarily, when lawyers undertake
a representation on a contingency basis, they bargain for a per-
centage of the recovery. That percentage is sufficiently high to
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time
he or she anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for
the time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis
but unsuccessful in result. Thus, in a rough and arbitrary way, the
contingent percentage fee accounts for the risk of nonrecovery.
For reasons already discussed 1 9 the percentage-of-recovery approach
is inappropriate when courts are setting fees. Nonetheless, the risk
of nonrecovery must be accounted for if these cases are to attract
lawyers. Courts can account for this risk by making one additional
inquiry. The court initially looks to the hourly rate for com-
parable representation where compensation is guaranteed. In ad-
justing that basic hourly rate where compensation is not guar-
anteed, the court should attempt to assess the likelihood of success
at the outset of the representation-the point at which the lawyer
is confronted with the decision whether to take the case, and, if so,
under what fee arrangement. In making this inquiry, courts should
consider "any information that may help to establish the probability
of success." 170 The Second Circuit has outlined the inquiry as
follows:
The tangible factors which comprise the "risk of litiga-
tion" might be determined by asking the following ques-
tions: has a relevant government action been instituted or,
perhaps, even successfully concluded against the defendant;
have related civil actions already been instituted by others;
and, are the issues novel and complex or straightforward
and well worn? Thus determined, the litigation risk factor
might well be translated into mathematical terms. 171
As the Second Circuit suggests, each of the elements of the fee
determination ultimately must be reduced to numbers. Obviously,
169 See text accompanying notes 83-91, 143-52 supra.
170 See Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976); City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685-86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977).
371 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
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there is no precise way to quantify the likelihood of success (or risk
of nonrecovery), particularly since the court is standing at the finish
line and assessing the way things looked at the starting gate. None-
theless, it is theoretically useful to think for a moment about what
a court would do if it were possible to determine precisely the
likelihood of success at the outset. If the court were to conclude
that there was no realistic chance of losing at the inception of the
case, the risk of nonrecovery would be zero, and the basic hourly
rate should not be adjusted. If the court were to conclude that
there was an even chance of success at the outset, it would in effect
be saying there was a fifty percent risk of nonrecovery. A lawyer
would have to take two of these cases on a contingent basis to receive
one fee. Accordingly, if risk were to be fully compensated, the
lawyer would be entitled to twice his basic hourly fee.
As a practical matter, however, a court can do no better than
to reach one of a few general conclusions concerning risk. If,
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable attorney looking at the
case from its outset, success was virtually assured, there has been
no significant risk and there should be no adjustment. If the court
concludes that success was more likely than not at the outset, an
increase in the fee award in the range of fifty percent would be
appropriate. Where the court concludes that the chance of success
was about even at the outset, an increase in the hourly rate in the
range of 100% appears appropriate. Finally, if the case appeared
unlikely to succeed when initiated, an increase of the basic hourly
rate of up to 200%/ may be justified to compensate the attorney for
the substantial risk undertaken. Beyond that, any attempt to quan-
tify feigns illusory precision and may greatly exaggerate the fee
awards in the least likely cases.
Two other points should be made with respect to accounting
for risk. First, there is no necessity of applying a risk multiplier to
the time expended in obtaining a fee award after the suit is suc-
cessfully concluded and the award is assured. Nor is there any risk
associated with post-settlement administration of a fund. Second,
it should be stressed that a risk factor need only be applied to non-
guaranteed time; to the extent that the attorneys are guaranteed
payment by a contract with their client, there is no risk of non-
recovery.
7 2
172 For example, if a lawyer who brings a class action case that produces a
common fund has been guaranteed by the named plaintiffs compensation of $30
per hour regardless of the outcome, and the lawyer's market rate is $100 per hour,
the risk multiplier should be applied only to the $70 per hour that was not
guaranteed.
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V. CONCLUSION
The approach to fee setting suggested by this Article-hours
justifiably expended, multiplied by the attorney's market rate, multi-
plied by the risk of nonrecovery-provides courts with a coherent
analytic framework for applying the factors they have traditionally
considered in fixing fees. In determining the time reasonably ex-
pended, the court accounts for the time and labor required and, in
large measure, the novelty and difficulty of the issues. In applying
the marketplace rate for the lawyer's time, with appropriate adjust-
ments for unusual circumstances present in a particular case 173 and
for "over-lawyering," 174 the court accounts for skill required, the
customary fee, the time limitations imposed, the experience and
ability of the attorneys, the undesirability of the case, and the
nature of the professional relationship with the client. Finally, in
determining the risk of nonrecovery, the court takes into account
the contingent nature of the fee.'175
Certain of the factors traditionally considered by the courts are
deliberately rejected. The most important of these is the monetary
amount involved in the litigation and the results obtained. Their
inclusion would not reflect sound law or sound policy.176 The
court should also exclude consideration of the preclusion of other
employment; if lawyers are compensated fully for their time, the
fact that they are not doing something else is economically irrele-
vant. Consideration of awards in similar cases is also rejected
because this factor is little more than a post hoc rationalization for
the result otherwise achieved. Finally, the court should not account
for the quality of the lawyer's work, except to the extent that the
lawyer's time is clearly excessive.1
77
The approach outlined has several distinct advantages. First,
and most important, it attempts to satisfy the underlying purposes
of fee awards, both in the statutory and equitable context. Second,
it is a uniform approach that can be applied whenever the court is
tasked with fee-setting, in contrast to the current tendency to travel
different paths in different cases. Third, while it necessarily leaves
the district court with important questions of judgment,178 it re-
173 See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
174 See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
175 See text accompanying notes 168-72 supra.
176 See text accompanying notes 83-91, 143-52 supra.
177 See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
178 For example, the court must determine if the time claimed was necessary,
if the work could have been performed by a person with less expertise, and what the
likelihood of success was at the outset of the suit.
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duces the fee determination to a series of essentially factual ques-
tions, the answers to which can be reviewed by appellate courts as
well as by lawyers and litigants:
1. How much time did the attorneys justifiably expend on
the lawsuit?
2. What is the hourly market rate of the particular lawyer
for similar legal services? If the particular attorney has no such
market rate for these services, what is the rate for lawyers in
the community with similar experience, background, skill and
reputation who handle cases of similar magnitude and
complexity?
3. What was the risk of nonrecovery at the outset of the
litigation?
Finally, another significant benefit of this alternative approach is
that it provides an analytical construct for rational thinking where
confusion and arbitrariness have prevailed.
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